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Abstract 
The role of public research organisations (PROs) has changed over the decades. They have engaged 
more in bringing new knowledge towards companies as a way to foster economic progress through 
technological renewal. The traditional response of PROs has been the creation of technology 
transfer offices, who have adopted a technology-push approach to bring new technologies to the 
market and foster (academic) entrepreneurship. This paper, by means of a case study in iMinds (a 
PRO on digital media and ICT in Belgium), presents a new approach, the so-called ‘flipped knowledge 
transfer approach’. By adopting this more market-driven approach to knowledge transfer, start-ups 
and SMEs in a region are reinforced and a fertile breeding ground for the creation of a regional 
cluster of innovation is fostered. This paper analyses the effects of such approach, and discusses the 
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Research institutions, such as universities and other public research organisations (PROs), have been 
engaging in knowledge transfer outside their boundaries for centuries, mostly using education and 
publications as channels. More recently, these PROs have been trying to find other, more direct 
ways to bring new knowledge into applications for business and society, usually facilitated by a 
technology transfer office (TTO) or industrial liaison office (ILO) (Guston, 1999; Debackere and 
Veugelers, 2005; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007). In this sense, PROs have been engaging increasingly in 
more entrepreneurship-related activities: establishing spin-off ventures, setting up investment 
funds, etc. This additional role has sometimes been described as the third mission of PROs (besides 
research and education) (Etzkowitz, 1998; Rothaermel et al., 2007; Dale Meyer, 2011). 
However, the common approach adopted by these TTOs relates closely to a technology-push or 
inside-out approach, where new knowledge is most commonly ‘pushed’ from the research 
institution towards third parties (e.g. through sale of intellectual property, licensing or creating spin-
off ventures to commercialise new technologies) (Birley, 2002; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007). This 
approach imposes specific challenges and many PROs are struggling to get enough benefits from 
their knowledge transfer activities, both in the short as well as the long run. 
Additionally, SMEs and start-ups face important challenges in getting access to the latest knowledge, 
state-of-the-art technologies and research results developed at PROs (Gibb, 2000; Nunes et al., 
2006). This is due to the fact that SME manage knowledge differently than large companies do 
(Desouza and Awazu, 2006) and PROs are not well-adapted to interact with SMEs (Gibb, 2000). For 
most (Western) economies, this becomes a real issue, since SMEs are the engines of economic 
growth and innovation. Indeed, SMEs typically account for at least 50% of employment generated in 
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economies and make up over 90% of the total amount of business in any region (FSB, 2014; IFC, 
2012; Singh et al., 2010). 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide a conceptually new approach to technology and knowledge 
transfer from PROs (the ‘flipped knowledge transfer’ model, which is more demand-driven and less 
technology-push) and to illustrate this new approach by means of a case study with preliminary 
results. In this flipped knowledge transfer approach (external) start-ups and SMEs play a key role and 
knowledge creation is no longer unidirectional, but rather based on co-creation. They can enable 
fast(er) adoption of new knowledge and technologies and inspire researchers for follow-up research 
activities. One of this new approach’s key advantages lies in the fact that knowledge and research 
results find a more ‘natural’ way towards market applications, given the demand-driven nature of 
the approach. The central research question addressed in this paper is: 
“(How) can a more demand-driven knowledge transfer approach in PROs be beneficial 
to SMEs (incl. start-ups) and the PRO itself in bringing new knowledge and technologies 
faster into application?” 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section embeds this paper’s topic in various 
literature streams related to academic entrepreneurship and the Triple Helix, technology and 
knowledge transfer and some theoretical foundations underlying this strand of research. 
Afterwards, the third section discusses the main methodological aspects of this paper. In fourth 
instance, an in-depth case study of a PRO (iMinds) in Belgium will be presented, together with the 
main results and findings. The last section brings the main implications forward, opens discussion on 
a more general level on the role of PROs in entrepreneurship and suggests some opportunities for 
further research in this domain. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
This case study is embedded in four main strands of literature. Firstly, the literature on the European 
Innovation Paradox will be discussed. Afterwards, the entrepreneurship theory and literature on 
academic entrepreneurship and the Triple Helix model will be addressed. In third instance, this 
literature review frames this study in the strand of research on technology and knowledge transfer. 
The fourth and last strand refers to the involvement of SMEs in clusters of innovation and their 
importance for regions and countries in economic growth. 
The last part of this literature review identifies gaps in this literature and the main research 
questions addressed by this study. 
 
2.1. The European Innovation Paradox 
 
The ‘Green Paper on Innovation’ (European Commission, 1995) has brought up the issue of the so-
called European (Innovation) Paradox. According to a number of studies (Tijssen and van Wijk, 1999; 
Klofsten and Jones-Evans, 2000; Brooksbank and Thomas, 2001; Clarysse et al., 2002; Goldfarb and 
Henrekson, 2003), Europe has been lagging behind some other regions around the globe (mainly the 
United States of America) when it comes to transferring research results to the market (successful 
applications in products and services for commercial and/or societal benefit). These poor results 
have amongst others been attributed to the more competitive American academic environment 
(mainly in terms of remuneration, promotion and job mobility) and legislative system (Goldfarb and 
Henrekson 2003) and to the more pronounced distinction between teachers and researchers in 
Europe and the relatively pre-determined pathway to obtain academic positions and promotions 
that hamper productive commercialisation (Giacometti 2001; Goldfarb and Henrekson 2003). Other 
studies have pointed to strong public sector science base in the EU coupled to rather poor R&D 
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activities in EU firms (Tijssen and van Wijk, 1999). On the other hand, a number of studies have 
challenged the existence of this European Innovation Paradox (see e.g. Dosi et al., 2006). 
Many (European) PROs have responded to this Innovation Paradox by installing a TTO with a mission 
to stimulate, coordinate and support commercialisation of science and research results. A study of 
De Cleyn et al. (2010) indicated that many TTOs in Europe have been established in the late nineties. 
These TTOs are (potentially) important actors in the Triple Helix, bringing public actors, industry and 
business, and science and academia together. 
 
2.2. Academic entrepreneurship and the Triple Helix 
 
The European Innovation Paradox, together with a number of additional changes in society, has 
forced PROs to rethink their roles and contributions towards business and society.  
As touched upon earlier, one of the responses has been the creation of a TTO in many PROs around 
Europe (and elsewhere) and an intensifying attention for and support of academic entrepreneurship 
within these PROs. TTOs play an active role in commercialising PRO research outcomes by 
identifying, protecting, marketing and licencing intellectual property developed by researchers 
(Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008). However, in analysing the impact of such TTO activity, studies 
focused more on the effectiveness of technological diffusion that used licencing as 
commercialisation mechanism rather than through spin-offs (Siegel et al., 2003a). Studies focusing 
on the impact of spin-off activity and TTOs engagement with start-ups and SMEs have been 
conducted less frequently. The main outcomes of the by Lockett and Wright (2005) and Powers and 
McDougall (2005) relate to the importance of TTO size and experience in explaining spin-off activity 
at PROs.  
The increased engagement of PROs in promoting and supporting entrepreneurial activities has not 
only been triggered by an internal reflex. PROs have become increasingly aware of the context in 
which they operate, as opposed to the classic image as ‘ivory tower’ (Thursby and Thursby, 2002; 
Etzkowitz et al., 2000) in which new knowledge was produced and disseminated through scientific 
publications and education (Rogers et al., 2001). PROs are important organisations embedded in a 
local and global ecosystem, in which various actors play different role and interactions have become 
even more a necessity than ever before. Scholarly research has conducted research on these 
interactions under the umbrella coined as “Triple Helix model”, which describes the interactions 
between academia, business and governments (Etzkowitz, 1998; Leydesdorff, 2000; Etzkowitz and 
Klofsten, 2005). Although academic entrepreneurship has existed for centuries, it has only recently 
been put on a prominent spot in policy agendas and PROs’ scope (Etzkowitz, 1998; Dale Meyer, 
2011). PROs can play an important role in the dynamics of a region, given their ability to create 
knowledge, attract firms to settle in their environment and foster job creation via spin-off 
establishment (Jones-Evans et al., 1999). Additionally, PRO inventions are an important source of 
knowledge spillovers (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003), potentially providing benefits for many 
stakeholders in a region. 
 
2.3. Technology and knowledge transfer 
 
As briefly touched upon earlier in this paper, this study builds on prior studies that envisaged 
understanding the models, implications and success factors of technology and knowledge transfer 
programs and organisations in PROs as well as in corporate environments. TTOs play an important 
role in supporting the translation from academic knowledge into applications. With the help of TTOs, 
PROs potentially impact and contribute to local and global economies at various levels: they develop 
new technologies and knowledge that can help solve issues and respond to needs in business and 
society (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Henderson et al., 1998), they can introduce new innovations and – 
e.g. through spin-off ventures – create new business that create new employment (Jones-Evans et 
al., 1999; Gunasekara, 2006), they create new knowledge that is beneficial to a wide myriad of 
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stakeholders (other researchers, students, policy makers, companies, …) (Gunasekara, 2006) and 
they can even become critical for an entire industry to fuel it with new inventions, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry that has (at least partially) become dependent on academic research to 
conduct basic research that can initiate the discovery of new drugs (Festel et al., 2011; Santos, 
2003). 
On a more general level, Teece (2003) has tried to understand the resource cost of transferring 
technological know-how from multinational firms (see also Teece, 1998). Indeed, knowledge has 
become a key raw material for many economies (Teece, 1998). Even despite the rapid increase in 
the use and possibilities of digital technologies, transferring knowledge from one actor to another 
remains challenging (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Argote and Ingram, 2000).  Several other studies have 
focused on technology and knowledge transfer from PROs (e.g. Lee, 1996; Siegel et al., 2003b; Heinzl 
et al., 2013; Ho et al., 2014). In this sense, a recent study by Clarysse et al. (2014) has identified a gap 
between knowledge and business ecosystem, which is currently not bridged by any initiative. The 
flipped knowledge transfer approach may be a tool that helps to (partially) bridge this gap. 
From a more financial lens, Bray and Lee (2000) have analysed the effect from technology and 
knowledge transfer on PROs. Their study concludes that PROs may benefit more from taking equity 
in their spin-offs than from licensing deals. In general, equity participations generate equal return 
over licensing contracts, but equity positions have the advantage of occasionally hitting the ‘jackpot’, 
which overall makes that taking equity in spin-offs maximizes the financial return that PROs can 
realise from their intellectual property (Bray and Lee, 2000). 
In a broader perspective, recent studies have also analysed the impact of technology transfer 
activities in upcoming economies such as China and its implications for global markets (Gross, 2013; 
Kafouros and Wang, 2014). According to these studies, China will undoubtedly become the world’s 
largest customer when it comes to technology and knowledge transfer activities in the coming 
decades (Gross, 2013; Miesing et al., 2014). However, the country is unlikely to achieve global 
leadership when it comes to new knowledge production in the coming decade (Gross, 2013; Miesing 
et al., 2014). 
 
2.4. Clusters of innovation and economic growth 
 
Last, but not least, this paper is embedded into the research strand on (global) clusters of 
innovation. Over the decades, it has become clear that start-ups are a major force in creating and 
driving new innovations to the market, thereby creating economic vitality for regions (Engel, 2014). 
Attracting such start-ups and creating a fertile breeding ground for them however requires a mix of 
ingredients that can only be provided at a regional scale, surpassing local capacities. AnnaLee 
Saxenian’s seminal work investigated the differences between the Boston and Silicon Valley 
approaches and eventually predicted the latter’s dominance (Saxenian, 1994). Her work has spurred 
more research in this domain and, as various regions around the globe have experimented with 
creating successful innovation hubs or clusters, cluster thinking has come to dominate the discussion 
and content of regional economic development policy (Engel, 2014; Howells, 2005). 
Clusters provide advantages to the local actors (Doeringer and Terkla, 1995): physical proximity 
enables economies of scale and scope (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 2001; Krugman, 1991), provides 
easier access to information (including the latest insights in academic knowledge and newly 
developed technologies in PROs), proximity to specialised suppliers and customers and reduced 
transaction costs, among other advantages (Porter, 1998; Porter, 2000). In real ‘clusters of 
innovation’ intense concentrations in specific industries emerge, resulting from an ongoing process 
of new start-up creation and fast commercialisation and adoption of new technologies (Engel, 2014; 
Engel and del-Palacio, 2009). These clusters of innovation are characterised by mobile assets (e.g. 
money, people, and information, including know-how and intellectual property (IP)) (Freeman and 
Engel, 2007; Bresnahan et al., 2001). Additionally, an entire service industry develops around these 
new start-ups and maturing businesses (Engel, 2014). 
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The concept of clusters of innovation is highly related to the Triple Helix model, where interactions 
between academia, industry and government play a central role. Indeed, many clusters of 
innovation, including the textbook example of Silicon Valley, have at some point been initiated or 
accelerated by some form of government intervention. In order to fuel the creation of a cluster of 
innovation, several authors have argued that especially the interactions between industry and 
academia are of critical importance (Liou and Liou, 2009; Huggins, 2008). In this sense, PROs and 
their TTOs play a crucial role in unlocking new knowledge and research outcomes for start-ups and 
other actors in a regional cluster. 
 
2.5. Research goals and hypotheses 
 
Given the increasing importance of cluster thinking and the role academic research plays in this 
context, knowledge and technology transfer have been demonstrated to play a prominent role in 
creation new technology-based ventures. The process of transferring knowledge and technologies 
from PROs to industrial actors (and broader society) has been understood more extensively in more 
recent years (see e.g. Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Argote and Ingram, 2000). However, current practices 
and scholar studies have focused on the more traditional way of bringing this knowledge and 
technologies into application, i.e. from a rather technology-push orientation (Siegel et al., 2003a). 
PROs adopting this approach have traditionally been transferring new knowledge and technologies 
through licenses on intellectual property rights towards third parties and/or through the creation of 
spin-off ventures (Siegel et al., 2003a; Birley, 2002). This approach has proven successful in a 
number of domains, including biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and micro-electronics (Zucker et al., 
2002; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). However, in a number of other technology domains, especially 
in those where patents as main mechanism to protect intellectual property, the success of this 
strategy is less rich (Markman et al., 2005).  
This paper seeks to present a case study of a PRO in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium, which 
has adopted a new approach when it comes to knowledge and technology transfer activities. This 
approach has been coined ‘flipped knowledge transfer’, given its more demand-driven nature. In this 
approach, start-ups established by individuals external to the PRO play a critical role in forming the 
lynchpin between the entrepreneurial world and academic research. The core attribute of this study 
is defined as: 
 
‘Flipped knowledge transfer’ refers to a demand-driven approach of knowledge and 
technology transfer activities at PROs, where the main driver to adopt new knowledge 
comes from start-ups external to the PRO that actively seek for academic knowledge that 
can be adopted to reinforce their products or applications. 
 
At the crossroads of the different domains touched upon by the literature review (i.e. the role of 
PROs in creating clusters of innovation and in overcoming the European Innovation Paradox through 




H1: The flipped knowledge transfer approach has a number of attributes which makes it 
more appropriate to bring academic knowledge into application compared to the 
‘classic’ technology transfer approach. 
 
H2: In the mid to long run, the flipped knowledge transfer approach potentially yields 
bigger (financial) rewards for PROs than the ‘classic’ technology transfer approach. 
 
H3: Any PRO can adopt strategies to embrace the concept of flipped knowledge transfer. 
 
This flipped knowledge transfer approach can be highly relevant for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
new product life cycles and technology cycles are getting shorter (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 2003; 
Christensen, 1997; LaBahn et al., 1996). This evolution forces companies to adopt new knowledge 
and technologies at faster pace to keep up with the latest technologies and keep ahead of 
competition. Secondly, and related to the first reason, the shortening half lifetime of knowledge 
makes knowledge become obsolete at fast(er) pace (Hershock, 2011). This should moves companies 
and PROs to interact more frequently to keep up-to-date with the latest developments. Additionally, 
policy makers and public opinion have become increasingly demanding towards PROs to create 
mechanisms to provide direct added value and (positive) impact with their research outcomes on 
society and business (Markman et al., 2005; Shane, 2005). This flipped knowledge transfer approach 
may provide a tool to address these needs and issues.  
In the same line of reasoning, there is mismatch in time between the availability of research results 
and the moment that SMEs decide to build applications based on this knowledge to pursue new 
business opportunities (Caputo et al., 2002; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002). Furthermore, the actual 
dissemination of research results uses channels that are difficult to access for innovation driven 
enterprises. Scientific publications and conference proceedings are often behind payment walls and 
are written in a language for researchers to understand and build upon. Part of this problem is 
solved by the open access policy of the EU but there is still a lot of work to describe research results 
in a way that is comprehensible for business actors and that allows them to identify future 
applications in their own space. The suggested approach can help bridge this time gap.  
 
 
3. Case study results and findings 
 
The current section presents the results of the case study. From a methodological perspective, this 
case study has been preceded by an elaborate literature review on the subject (a more detailed 
literature review paper is in the making). Using the outcomes of this literature review, the scene for 
this case study has been set following the guidelines of Yin (2014). Afterwards, data have been 
collected and coded by multiple researchers from different institutions to ensure robust data 
interpretations and avoid issues with self-reported data (Gonyea, 2005).  
The case study starts with an in-depth presentation of the case study itself. Afterwards, the main 
results and outcomes are discussed at two levels: first, the main results of the case study itself will 
be presented, followed by a more general discussion of outcomes and benefits of a more open 
approach to academic entrepreneurship and knowledge transfer. 
 
3.1. The case of iMinds, a PRO in Belgium 
 
This study describes and analyses the flipped knowledge transfer approach through an in-depth case 
study. The subject of the case study is iMinds, a public research organisation (PRO) in Flanders 
(Northern part of Belgium). iMinds has been established in 2004 by the government of the Flemish 
Region, under its original name of IBBT (Interdisciplinary Institute for Broadband Technology). The 
organisation, funded by the Flemish Region, was given the task to develop demand-driven research 
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and solutions for the digital media and ICT sector and foster the business and societal application 
and adoption of newly developed technologies, knowledge, products and services. Applying 
knowledge and newly created technologies to addressing societal and business challenges in this 
sense is part of iMinds’ core mission. 
iMinds as an organisation somehow acts as network integrator for research and entrepreneurship in 
digital media and ICT in Flanders. In this role, iMinds collaborates with universities and university 
colleges and other actors in the ecosystem supporting entrepreneurship (including SMEs, large 
companies, TTOs, incubators, pitching events, financers and others). From a research side, iMinds 
has strategic partnerships with all five universities in Flanders (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Ghent 
University, Hasselt University, KU Leuven and University of Antwerp). Through these partnerships, 
iMinds has direct access to and involvement with the vast majority of (ICT-related) researchers in 
Flanders. In this sense, iMinds acts as lynchpin in a Triple Helix ecosystem for the Flemish digital 
media and ICT community, integrating various actors and stakeholders. 
 
The activities of iMinds are centred on two pillars: [1] collaborative and demand-driven research, in 
close cooperation with Flemish, Belgian and international companies, government organisations and 
other societal actors, and [2] foster entrepreneurial behaviour amongst researchers and externals 
and supporting commercialisation and other entrepreneurial activities with various programs. 
Through the latter role, iMinds has since its inception been engaging in technology and knowledge 
transfer activities. However, in the early years of the organisation (2004-2011), iMinds has adopted 
the common ‘technology-push’ knowledge transfer approach, while in more recent years the new, 
flipped knowledge transfer approach has been deployed. This case study describes and analyses the 
potential benefits and drawbacks of this approach, by analysing the effects on individual 
researchers’ entrepreneurial appetite, dynamics in research groups and the ability of external 
entrepreneurs and SMEs to get access to and adopt new technologies and knowledge created in 
PROs. 
 
3.2. Results of the case study 
 
Since its inception in 2004, iMinds has supported over 65 start-up and spin-off initiatives in its 
incubation program (called iStart). The projects in this program receive pre-seed funding and an 
intensive coaching program to help the entrepreneurs make the transition from technical proof-of-
concept to a real business. The program started off from a rather classical technology transfer 
approach, where technologies and knowledge developed in the research groups were transferred to 
business and society using the common approaches (creation of spin-offs, licensing …). However, 
since 2011 not only spin-off projects started by iMinds’ own researchers were / are supported, but 
independent entrepreneurs with innovative digital media and ICT applications are also welcome and 
can apply for support. 
This new approach imposed a number of important challenges to the organisation. In the first place, 
it required an additional investment in terms of funding (required pre-seed funding for the 
incubation projects) and manpower (increase in coaches and supporting staff). These investments 
are however relatively limited in absolute and relative terms (approximately 1 million EUR). The 
second challenge related to corporate culture and mind-set, especially at the research side. Opening 
up the incubation program for external entrepreneurs required a quick intake and evaluation 
process, since especially in digital media and ICT the speed of innovation and technological progress 
forces entrepreneurs to keep up pace and make sure they benefit from short market windows. The 
overall intake and evaluation process was reorganised from a case-by-case evaluation whenever a 
potential spin-off project signed up (which took about 1-1.5 month to go through the intake process) 





Since opening up the incubation program in the summer of 2011, the number of submissions as well 
as the number of supported incubation projects has been on the rise (see Figure 1). In the period 
2004-2013, 65 incubation projects have been supported, of which 22 originated directly out of 
academic research. These 22 projects would be the ones commonly described as academic spin-offs 
(ASOs). 
During the incubation program (typically between 6 and 18 months), the start-up receive a small 
amount of pre-seed funding, as well as in-depth coaching. The aim of the program is to support 
start-up teams that at least have a proof-of-concept of their technology or first product towards 
market introduction of their first product(s) and (if needed) towards a stage where they are mature 
enough to attract follow-up investments by private (and public) investors. The coaching program 
consists of daily support by a dedicated coach, complemented with workshops and one-on-one in-
depth coaching by industry and subject experts (e.g. on marketing and branding, business-to-
business sales, pitching, usability or preparing investment rounds). In some cases, the teams are 
reinforced by an entrepreneur-in-residence, which temporarily joins the start-up team. 
 




What is more important, since 2011 iMinds has developed its flipped knowledge transfer approach, 
54 new incubation projects have received substantial support. The origin of these 45 projects can be 
described as follows (see also Figure 2): 
• 15 projects (28%) concerned ASOs, bringing academic technologies and knowledge to the 
market with researchers as lead entrepreneurs; 
• The other 39 projects (72%) concerned start-up initiatives by external entrepreneurs, where 
the main product idea(s) did not find their origin in academic research; 
• 16 of these 39 projects however (30% of the ‘grand’ total) have been matched with 
academic research, meaning the external entrepreneurs started a collaboration with one or 
more research groups to reinforce their technological and knowledge base and adopt and 








The net result of this flipped knowledge transfer approach is quintuple: 
1. Academic research results find a more natural way towards ‘real life’ applications (given the 
demand-driven nature of the model). The start-ups involved greatly benefit from this direct 
input of (state-of-the-art) academic knowledge, while researchers get enthused by seeing 
their technologies ‘at work’. 
2. Researchers get feedback from the viewpoint of implementation, which often leads to 
further (contract) research. In many cases, the cooperation has led to joint project proposals 
to apply for innovation subsidies and joint research projects, in favour of both the start-up 
(which gets means to continue or even intensify the cooperation) and the research group 
(which receives additional funding ensuring continuity or even growth). 
3. Barriers between small, young companies and researchers to interact have been diminished 
to a large extent. This does not only lead to more frequent and intense cooperation between 
the two actors, it also creates a channel for researchers (mainly PhD students) to find good 
employers (and vice versa for the start-up to be able to attract highly-skilled employees). 
This becomes even more relevant for the PhD students, since 80% of them need to pursue a 
career outside academia after successfully defending their PhD (Brentel, 2012; Marynen, 
2012; Mascarelli, 2012). 
4. SMEs and start-ups gain (easier) access to the latest developments in academic research, 
which enables them to differentiate their products and services through innovation based 
on relevant, demand-driven research. This could give them a competitive advantage or at 
least the opportunity to compete with more or less equal (knowledge) weapons against 
larger corporations. 
5. PROs in the long run may attract more revenue for their research activities through long-
term collaboration (joint research projects, contract research, funding of PhDs …). In one of 
the most successful cases, a start-up now funds two full-time PhD students at a research 
group and is involved in two joint research projects for which external funding has been 
obtained (one project funded by a regional innovation agency and one funded by the 
European Commission). This long-term cooperation has been supplemented with one-off 





4. Implications and discussion 
 
4.1. Implications of the case study 
 
Research publications have been a traditional mechanism to disseminate new knowledge and 
research outcomes, mainly from a viewpoint to inform and inspire other researchers to further build 
on it. New methods may be needed, tailored to the needs of companies to transfer knowledge and 
get it adopted. Developing a new model of thinking about knowledge dissemination is certainly an 
intellectually interesting problem; where (part of) the solution may be to think out of the box and 
abandon a technology-push approach (or at least develop an alternative). 
The implications of adopting a flipped knowledge transfer approach are threefold. Firstly, this model 
requires a new approach. Matchmaking between researchers and entrepreneurs needs to be done 
by people and organisations with enough domain expertise to lay links between the technological 
and knowledge needs and questions of companies (start-ups, SMEs) and research activities. This 
matchmaking is not trivial, since mostly these needs and questions are less explicit and somewhat 
masked (often entrepreneurs don’t know exactly what they’re looking for). As a result, the flipped 
knowledge transfer cannot be organised using the same, rather generic model as most PROs 
currently adopt. This new approach even more requires domain experts. 
A second implication relates to the transferability of the approach, which differentiates from the 
classical technology transfer approach. Given the nature of the industry and domain (digital media 
and ICT), the technologies often concern ‘softer’ forms of knowledge (less patents, more software, 
algorithms and methodologies). Therefore, the terminology ‘knowledge transfer’ seems more 
appropriate than ‘technology transfer’, even though both forms relate to transferring new 
technologies and various forms of knowledge. However, in the flipped knowledge transfer approach, 
more attention is (and should be) devoted to closing the knowledge feedback loop within an 
ecosystem of a particular research and technology cluster. In industries with shorter R&D cycles and 
easier transfer of knowledge (such as digital media and ICT), adopting this flipped knowledge 
transfer approach may happen more easily. 
Placing the demand-side central in this approach is the third implication. This requires efforts from 
both TTOs and researchers. By positioning research groups’ assets well and implementing processes 
where collaboration between companies and researchers can emerge quickly, attractiveness of 
PROs towards SMEs and start-ups increases significantly. This entrepreneurial-friendly climate is a 
prerequisite for successfully implementing a flipped knowledge transfer approach, allowing 





Worldwide most PROs have only been engaging explicitly in technology and knowledge transfer 
activities for the last few decades. Compared to their longstanding history and tradition in 
conducting research and providing education, which have been part of their core activities for 
centuries sometimes, this relatively new activity domain has been subject to debate and some form 
of experimentation to find the most appropriate model to achieve success. However, many PROs 
have not found the recipe yet to deploy successful technology transfer activities. 
The value of this case study lies mainly in highlighting a different approach. PROs' 'classical' 
technology transfer approach builds on a technology-push or inside-out model, where new 
technologies developed within these PROs are 'pushed' towards business and society and they will 
hopefully find applications and be adopted. Prior studies have however demonstrated the relative 
pre-matureness of most PRO technologies when brought to the market (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; 
Shane, 2004), requiring substantial additional efforts in translating the technology into market-ready 
products and applications. 
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The case study on iMinds tries to bring up a different, more outside-in approach. This so-called 
flipped knowledge transfer approach adopts an inverse perspective, whereby market players 
interact much more frequently with researchers and whereby PRO technology and knowledge is 
'pulled' outside the PRO in a more demand-driven approach. In this model, start-ups and 
entrepreneurs play a pivotal role. 
 
Even though this model is rather new, the first results indicate an interesting potential for PRO's 
technology transfer approach. These positive results refer to impact for individuals (mainly for 
researchers, who can find real-life applications for their knowledge and who could find interesting 
career options), start-ups and companies (who can gain a competitive advantage and improve their 
products with state-of-the-art research outcomes, as well as get access to highly-skilled people) and 
PROs (who get input from industry, and potentially get additional revenue streams and more 
extensive cooperation with business). However, the model and its effects, both directly and 
indirectly as well as in the short and long run, deserve further attention and research. It opens the 
debate for more studies on the impact of technology and knowledge transfer programs, as well as 
for further search for best practices and alternatives to boost the commercialisation of academic 
research output.  
A second important contribution of this case study is its value in making the potential benefits for 
PROs of opening up their entrepreneurship programs and support towards 'externals' explicit. 
Tearing down the walls of the 'ivory tower' may have substantial positive impact in the short and 
long run, as well as on organisational and individual level. It is obviously clear that not all PROs can 
(probably) open up their TTO activities and entrepreneurship programs as widely as iMinds. It may 
be difficult for universities or other PROs to spend scarce resources on supporting totally unrelated 
start-ups or SMEs. Opening up such programs has far-reaching implications on an organisation, both 
in terms of competences required as well as means and processes that need to be adapted (mainly, 
but not limited to the TTO level). However, the authors firmly believe that a certain level of 
openness, embracing at least those entrepreneurs and start-ups that can be linked directly to 
researchers and benefit from input of academic knowledge, has a positive effect on the start-up, the 
PRO and the individuals involved (thereby maybe only excluding the category of fully external 
entrepreneurs of Figure 2). More frequent interactions between researchers and entrepreneurs 
foster knowledge spill-overs, reinforce the economic tissue in a region and act as enabler to form a 
cluster of innovation. 
 
PROs may experience a number of obstacles when trying to implement a flipped knowledge transfer 
approach. The first one may relate to the legal framework. Not all PROs may be allowed to spend 
part of their scarce resources to support (initially) unrelated companies. Secondly, this transition 
requires a new set of procedures and processes on behalf of the PROs to deal with such cooperation 
in a very flexible and speedy manner. Specifically for start-ups, speed of go-to-market and agility are 
critical for their survival chances (De Coster and Butler, 2005; Power and Reid, 2005). For this kind of 
cooperation to become successful, both sides need to adapt. Another important element relates to 
the means in terms of people, expertise and (eventually) funding. A flipped knowledge transfer 
approach to foster entrepreneurship around a PRO can only become successful if it becomes part of 
a PRO’s strategy. The authors believe, based on the first results, that sector expertise is required to 
fully realise the approach’s potential, which has implications on TTO’s staffing requirements. A 
fourth and last major success factor for successful implementation of the flipped knowledge transfer 
approach relates to the demand-driven nature of PRO research. iMinds is by definition a demand-
driven PRO, where (almost) all research efforts are conducted in close cooperation with industry and 
society stakeholders. As a result, research efforts are closer to end-user applications and closer to 
the market. This may impose a challenge for a number of PROs, especially in safeguarding a good 
balance between fundamental and applied research (Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002; Gibbons et al., 
1994). Based on the results of this case study, the authors believe however that even when research 
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is partially reoriented towards more demand-driven needs, this will on a longer term also positively 
impact fundamental research, since new challenges and opportunities can be identified based on 
concrete implementation of new knowledge and technologies in entrepreneurial settings. 
 
The current study has several limitations, which in turn lead to a number of opportunities for further 
research. The results of this case study are based on a relatively short term implementation of the 
flipped knowledge transfer approach. More research should be conducted on this approach on a 
longer term to fully understand its implications, benefits and challenges. Even though the first 
results are very promising and point in the direction of a positive effect on short, mid and long term 
for PROs and start-ups, further research should more deeply analyse to what extent the benefits 
surpass that of the ‘classic’ technology transfer approach. Secondly, this study was conducted on a 
single case study, which obviously has its limitations. Follow-up studies could replicate this study in 
other settings and organisations to fully understand the impact of local and organisational settings 
on the effect of applying the flipped knowledge transfer approach. Additionally, further research on 
how and when this approach can be replicated for other types of PROs could add substantial value 
to this field in general. 
 
This case study has explored the topic of a flipped knowledge transfer approach as tool to stimulate 
the creation of clusters of innovation and to strengthen market adoption of academic research in 
concrete applications. The more demand-driven approach stimulates start-ups and SMEs, which are 
key in creating clusters of innovation in a region and are responsible for the majority of wealth and 
job creation. In this sense, PROs can play a crucial role on a regional level in reinforcing (and also in 
creating) entrepreneurship. Despite the limitations of this case study, the first results of such 
approach have proven positive for the PROs, researchers and start-ups involved. PROs and their 
TTOs will play an increasingly important role in regional dynamics, especially for technology clusters 
and start-ups. This flipped knowledge transfer approach can be an additional tool in truly realising 
the potential of the Triple Helix Model and creating innovation hubs where new start-ups flourish 
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